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Trade and the Competitiveness Agenda
José Guilherme Reis and Thomas Farole
Export-Led Growth, the Crisis, and the End 
of an Era
The dramatic expansion in global trade over recent decades
has contributed significantly to diversification, growth, and
poverty reduction in many developing countries. This period
of rapid export growth has been enabled by two critical
structural changes in global trade: (1) the vertical and spatial
fragmentation  of  manufacturing  into  highly  integrated
“global production networks,” and (2) the rise of services
trade and the growth of “offshoring.” Both of these, in turn,
were made possible by major technological revolutions; and
they were supported by multilateral trade policy reforms
and broad liberalizations in domestic trade and investment
environments worldwide.
The global economic crisis came crashing into the middle
of this long-running export-led growth party during 2008
and 2009. Between the last quarter of 2007 and the second
quarter of 2009, global trade contracted by 36 percent. But
as the recovery started to strengthen in 2010 (at least until
the clouds began to form over Europe), the longer-term im-
pacts of the crisis on the policy environment regarding trade
and growth were becoming more apparent. Indeed, in addi-
tion to raising concerns over the global commitment to trade
liberalization, the crisis has also led to some serious rethink-
ing  of  some  of  the  conventional  wisdom  regarding  the
growth agenda—the most important result of which is the
likelihood that governments will play a much more activist
role in the coming years. There are three principal reasons
why governments are likely to be more actively involved in
industrial and trade policy in the coming years. 
First, the crisis has undone faith in markets and discred-
ited laissez-faire approaches that rely simply on trade policy
liberalization. Instead, governments and local markets have
been “rediscovered.” In this sense, the demand for activist
government is likely to go well beyond financial markets and
regulation, and it will affect the policy environment in which
trade and industrial strategies are designed.
Second, the crisis has highlighted the critical importance
of diversification (of sectors, products, and trading partners)
in reducing the risks of growth volatility. The recent era of
globalization contributed to substantial specialization of
The global economic crisis has forced a major rethinking of the respective roles of governments and markets in the
processes of trade and growth. Indeed, industrial policy seems to be back in fashion—or, at least, talking about it is.
But a renewed “activism” by government in the trade and growth agenda need not mean a return to old-style
policies of import substitution and “picking winners.” Instead, it may mean a stronger focus on competitiveness by
unlocking the constraints to private sector–led growth. This note discusses the renewed role of government in trade
and growth policy from the competitiveness angle, and it suggests some priorities for the new competitiveness agenda.
Talent Abroad Promoting Growth and Institutional Development  
at Home: Skilled Diaspora as Part of the Country
Yevgeny Kuznetsov 
The Twin Problem of Second-Generation 
Reforms  
As developing countries embark on and advance second-gener-
ation reforms—changing “rules of the game” in public finance, 
education, innovation, health systems or infrastructure provi-
sion—they  face  an  acute  shortage  of  competent,  motivated 
people to lead and manage the reforms. And it is not just the 
reforms that need to be managed. Vested interests (those that 
stand to lose from change and therefore defend “business as 
usual”) need to be tackled as well. This is the twin problem of 
reforms. In this situation, competent individuals who know 
the country well, yet are not a part of the vested interests, can 
be compared to proverbial Archimedean levers to trigger and 
sustain the change. Indispensable yet rare, they become insti-
tutions themselves. The search for these skilled or educated 
workers often goes abroad—to skilled diaspora. The Africa re-
gion, where the grip of vested interests is particularly strong, is 
at the forefront of this trend for recruiting diaspora (the presi-
dent of Liberia and recent finance ministers of Nigeria are re-
cent examples). 
To confront the established and entrenched interests, dias-
pora skills alone will not suffice. Credibility, reputation, a 
risk-taking  attitude,  long-term  planning  horizon,  tenacity, 
and  perseverance  are  also  essential.  Individuals  with  such 
qualities are considered “overachievers” to denote their will-
ingness to share their skills and education with their home 
country rather than seek only personal gain. Motivation and 
modes of engagement of diaspora overachievers with home 
countries is the focus of an on-going action learning project.1 
This note highlights two findings from the project regarding 
the process of engagement of the overachievers with home 
As developing countries embark on a policy agenda of innovation-based growth, they face an acute shortage of competent 
individuals who know the country well, but who are not part of the “status quo” and therefore have no vested interests other 
than the best possible country outcome. Paradoxically, the search for these individuals often leads to the country’s talent 
abroad—its skilled diaspora. The best and brightest, who are crucial for innovation, have often left the country in search of 
better opportunities. The usual policy focus—encourage return of talent to the home country—is often neither realistic nor 
necessary: members of skilled diasporas can just as effectively engage in joint continuous projects with the home country 
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countries and the process of institutional development. First, 
the massive return of talent to the home country is typically 
neither realistic nor necessary: diaspora overachievers can just 
as effectively engage in joint continuous projects with the 
home country without returning “home”—a phenomenon 
called “brain circulation’’ (Saxenian 2006; Kuznetsov 2006). 
When diaspora formulate joint projects, they do not think 
about far-reaching reforms or institutional development. Yet, 
and this is the second message, the institutional development 
impact can be significant. 
Examples of Diaspora Impact on Institution-
al Development
In 1997, Ramón L. García, a Chilean applied geneticist and bio-
technology entrepreneur with a PhD from the University of 
Iowa,  contacted  Fundación  Chile,  a  private-public  entity 
charged with technology transfer in the area of renewable re-
sources. García is the chief executive officer of InterLink Bio-
technologies, a Princeton, New Jersey–based company he co-
founded in 1991. After jointly reviewing their portfolios of 
initiatives, Fundación and Interlink founded a new, co-owned 
company to undertake long-term research and development 
projects. These projects were needed to transfer key technolo-
gies to Chile to sustain the competitiveness of its rapidly grow-
ing agribusiness sector. Without the combination of García’s 
deep knowledge of Chile and his advanced U.S. education and 
exposure to U.S. managerial practice and experience as an en-
trepreneur, the new company would have been inconceivable.
The fact that skilled expatriates can create enormous bene-
fits for their countries of origin has come to sudden attention in 
recent years through the conspicuous contributions that the 
large, highly skilled, manifestly prosperous, and well-organized 
Chinese and Indian diasporas have made to their home coun-
tries. But García’s collaboration with Fundación Chile suggests 
that diasporas do not need to be large and voluminous to pro-
duce an impact: 10 cases of “Ramón Garcia” could transform 
entire sectors of the economy in relatively small countries like 
Chile. Moreover, García’s collaboration with Fundación Chile 
suggests that even sparsely populated, informal diaspora net-
works linking small home countries with their talent abroad 
have some institutional resources, and may prove capable of de-
veloping more. Overall, García has created three biotech firms 
with Fundación Chile. 
Chile Global2—a network of about 100 “overachievers” of 
Chilean  origin—was  established  in  2005  to  institutionalize 
contributions that “Ramón Garcías” can make to the Chilean 
innovation system. However, this is not where the story ends, 
but rather where it begins. Chile Global promotes mentoring 
relationships between innovation start-ups in Chile and Chil-
ean “overachievers” abroad. In this endeavor, the Chileans can 
study (yet not copy) a now-famous Taiwanese (China) experi-
ence of creating an early stage venture capital (VC) industry. 
When the Taiwanese (China) government decided to pro-
mote VC industry in the beginning of the 1980s, it had neither 
the capabilities nor a blueprint. Many were opposed to the idea 
because the concept of VC was foreign to traditional Taiwanese 
(China) practice, in which family members closely controlled 
all of their businesses’ financial affairs. Entrenched interests in 
maintaining the status quo were strong. 
The decision by tens of thousands of Taiwan’s  (China) most 
talented university students to pursue engineering graduate 
degrees in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, and to 
take jobs there after graduation, turned out to be part of the 
solution  for  the  VC  industry.  Opportunities  in  the  United 
States, were  superior to those at home For instance, the large 
Hinschu Science Park, opened in 1980, was unable to find ten-
ants despite aggressive efforts to lure multinationals. Outsiders 
in Silicon Valley, the immigrants found each other in technical 
associations and alumni networks that also allowed them to 
stay in touch with their counterparts in Taiwan (China). But 
few considered returning home permanently. Policy makers 
complained about this “brain drain” and sought to limit it and 
none foresaw that it could be an asset. 
A search network (a network to identify successive con-
straints and then people or institutions that can help mitigate 
the these constraints) consisting initially of key, dynamic, and 
forward-looking members of the Taiwanese (China) govern-
ment and leading overseas Chinese engineers in Silicon Valley 
was central to the emergence of the VC industry. This network 
did not have a blueprint, yet it did have a role model (Silicon 
Valley) and a clear idea of “what to do next.” By defining each 
subsequent step along the road, the network became wider and 
eventually incorporated skeptics and opponents. Through a 
process of intense interactions with the Taiwanese (China) di-
aspora in Silicon Valley, new laws for VC industry and institu-
tions such as Seed Fund provided matching capital contribu-
tions to private VC funds. Two American-style venture funds, 
H&Q Asia Pacific and Walden International Investment Group, 
were also created in the mid 1980s. They were managed by 
U.S.-educated Chinese living overseas who received invitations 
to relocate to Taiwan (China). Once the first venture funds 
proved successful, domestic banks and large companies created 
their own VC funds. Once those started to payoff, even the con-
servative family groups decided to invest in VC funds and infor-
mation technology businesses. 
By the late 1980s, when companies like Acer and the return-
ee company Microtek were publicly listed on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange, the venture capital industry in Taiwan (China) took 
off. The conspicuous success of these venture-backed startups 
attracted growing numbers of overseas Chinese back from the 
United States to start businesses. By 1996, more than 2,500 
engineers and scientists had returned to work in the Hinschu 
Science Park and 40 percent of the 203 companies based in the 
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The extension of diaspora entrepreneurial projects from co-
founding joint firms in their home countries to cocreating insti-
tutional infrastructure so that many similar firms can flourish 
is natural. The initial objectives of Ramón García and his peers 
from Taiwan (China) were both modest and specific: to ad-
vance  their  professional  interests  by  setting  up  technology 
firms in their home countries. Yet, as the constraints of the 
home country institutional environment became apparent to 
them, they engaged in advancing institutional reform to reme-
dy some of these constraints. Successful growth of knowledge-
based firms and formation of appropriate institutional environ-
ment  became  two  sides  of  the  same  coin.  Innovation 
entrepreneurship has blossomed into institutional and policy 
entrepreneurship. 
International Mobility of the Highly Skilled: 
Key Stylized Facts
Are these examples mere oddities, exceptions to the general 
rule, which by the nature of being exceptions are then difficult 
to engage systematically into reform process? The following 
stylized facts suggest that the potential of diaspora overachiev-
ers should be taken seriously. 
Agglomeration of talent and increasing returns to skills  
Migration of skills affects both developed and developing coun-
tries. Due to the increasing returns to skills, talent seeks the 
environment of similarly talented peers. Few centers of excel-
lence, such as Silicon Valley, are magnets of skills for both devel-
oped and developing countries. For instance, somewhat coun-
terintuitively, the United Kingdom (UK), not China or India, 
used to hold the largest stock of tertiary educated nationals 
abroad (table 1). Arguably, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) data are highly imperfect 
and outdated, yet the prominence of the UK’s and Germany’s 
diasporas is noteworthy. 
Supply side: professional advancement of diaspora members 
Talent needs time to mature and advance in professional hier-
archy. Junior foreign professionals might prefer to conceal and 
even to forget its foreign origin for the fear of discrimination 
and  to  focus  exclusively  on  professional  advancement.  As 
overachievers emerge and become more numerous and di-
verse, senior members of the diaspora start to mentor junior 
members. As many diaspora overachievers reach the top of 
professional hierarchy, a collective credibility emerges. The 
specific trajectory of how each diaspora member made it to 
the top is invariably unique and so the experiences and capa-
bilities of diasporas from Israel, India, China and Armenia, 
which are examples of collective credibility and influence, are 
unique. As time goes by, the relatively young, skilled diasporas 
of Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe are maturing 
and advancing, suggesting a higher incidence of overachievers. 
This is one reason why the size of skilled diasporas is far from 
a perfect predictor of the number of overachievers. The Phil-
ippines has a very large tertiary-educated diaspora, yet rela-
tively few overachievers. 
Demand side: increasingly diverse pockets of dynamism at home
Durable macroeconomic, political and social stability, which 
are now a fact of life in most of the developing world, stimulate 
development of regional and sectoral clusters. This signals dy-
namism and growth, even if the national economy is slow grow-
ing or stagnating. Such increasingly diverse pockets of dyna-
mism are sources of demand for highly skilled expatriates and 
brain circulation networks.
Analytical Framework: Heterogeneity of 
Institutions 
To develop operational implications of diaspora engagement 
with home countries, one needs a compelling theory of insti-
tutional development at home, a view that helps to identify 
entry points for diaspora contributions. The central concep-
tual block of such a theory is heterogeneity of home country 
institutions. 
The recent growth literature shows that growth is not hard 
to start, but keeping it going is not easy: doing so requires atten-
tion to the context of growth-binding constraints and situation-
specific ways to resolve them (Hausmann, Rodrik and Sabel 
2007; Sabel 2007).  Likewise, the same goes for institutions: it 
is almost always possible to find some that are working (Sabel 
2007; Saxenian and Sabel 2008). The issue is using the ones 
that work to improve those that don’t. This hypothesis assumes 
that there are nearly always opportunities for development in a 
given economy, and that some actors, private and public, begin 
to take advantage of them.  But while development in this view 
is not hard to start, neither is it self perpetuating. Senior public 
sector officials with a drive, vision, and ability to take risks 
(public  sector  or  policy  entrepreneurs)  introduce  new  pro-
Table 1. Stock of Tertiary Educated Expatriates in 
OECD Economies, 2000
Rank  Country/economy  No. of tertiary 
      educated expatriates
1   United Kingdom    1,051,885 
2   India    996,813 
3   Philippines    886,653 
4   Germany    855,815 
5   China    799,834 
6   Mexico    473,923 
7   S. Korea    425,152 
14   Taiwan (China)    263,086 
21   Ukraine    206,471 
32   Brazil    140,764 
67   Chile    62,072 
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grams and policies. Often they do that on an organizational pe-
riphery, outside of the grip of entrenched interests. The key is 
to explain how these institutional and policy start-ups evolve, 
expand, scale up, get transformed, or expire.     
Our example of Chile provides a good illustration in this re-
gard. The country’s institutional framework is far from perfect, 
yet it does have a segment that performs well enough to take 
calculated risks in developing new programs and approaches, to 
be accountable for such calculated risk-taking, and to assure 
continuity of performance with the change of administrations. 
Heterogeneity of public sector institutions is matched by 
heterogeneity of the diasporas of the highly skilled. Only a few 
are experienced, successful, and resourceful enough to engage 
in a dialogue about creating innovation firms and institutional 
dynamics. But these few individuals could be enough to trigger 
a process of reform. Search networks may then match and link 
better  performing  and  dynamic  segments  of  diasporas  and 
home country institutions, tantamount to “Archimedean le-
vers” to initiate change and introduce new institutions. 
Usually two issues are at play. First, as already noted, the lo-
cal elite are often entrenched. Diaspora members, in contrast, 
know their countries intimately, but they are not (necessarily) 
entrenched.  Recall  our  Taiwan  (China)  example  of  venture 
capital  industry:  overachievers  in  Silicon  Valley  not  only 
brought expertise on VC industries, they also helped a cham-
pion in the government to make the case for establishing that 
industry in Taiwan (China) in the first place and that was done 
despite overt resistance from a conservative and closely held lo-
cal financial sector. Before catching up, one needs to wake up, 
and the diaspora overachievers are sometimes indispensable in 
providing a wake-up call: they have a rare combination of cred-
ibility, motivation, and expertise to do that.3 
The second consideration relates to the so-called learning or 
switching costs of introduction of a new institution.  In the me-
dium term, a new institution (say, private credit bureau) can 
benefit all stakeholders, yet in the short run there are switching 
costs for actors (such as local banks) to learn new skills and rou-
tines, and to overcome initial resistance to innovation. The 
switching costs can be high.  For instance, many international 
firms have attempted to establish private credit bureaus in Ar-
menia, and were deterred by high switching costs, but a dias-
pora overachiever from California (with the usual combination 
of profit maximization and intrinsic motivation to get involved 
in Armenia) had a planning horizon long enough to make the 
switching profitable and worthwhile. 
Ultimately, it is the dynamic segments of home country in-
stitutions that will do the work. However crucial the Silicon 
Valley overachievers were in triggering the Taiwanese (China) 
VC industry, it was a set of new national programs and proce-
dures that made the difference: the diaspora members help to 
perform the search for individuals, expertise, and institutions 
to articulate a missing component of development. 
Skills Abroad as Change Agents at Home: 
Toward a Typology
Economists are familiar with top-down and bottom-up institu-
tional  dynamics.  Diaspora  experiences  provides  ample  evi-
dence of both. Reform teams are often composed of the return-
ing students and experts as in Indonesia (Berkeley Mafia) and 
South Korea (formation of Economic Planning Board and Gov-
ernment Research Institutes in 1970s and 1980s). Middle East 
(Kenner  2010)  and  Africa  provide  further  examples.  Even 
more numerous and diverse are examples of bottom-up dy-
namics when a single institutional entrepreneur establishes an 
enclave organization in higher education, health, or other sec-
toral domain (from Africa, Asia, and other parts of the world). 
Reform dynamics initiated by a group of returning migrants 
that led to gradual but far-reaching changes in electricity and 
other rural infrastructure provision in Morocco in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Iskander 2010) is another example. 
Yet, in spite of the apparent differences, both top-down and 
bottom-up reforms are vertical and somewhat heroic, as they 
crucially depend on individuals—reform teams in the top-down 
transformation or a policy entrepreneur in a bottom-up case. 
Accordingly, the transformation is vulnerable: a new institu-
tion established by an entrepreneur functions well as long as it 
remains an enclave within (dysfunctional) domestic institu-
tions or an exclave of the world economy—it hits a wall once it 
attempts to diffuse or scale up. Similarly, reform teams leading 
top-down transformation can either be removed or with time 
can become part of the established elite they sought to trans-
form. The top-down reform is also vulnerable because it relies 
on return migration—often a plainly unrealistic or expensive 
(cost of salary subsidies to make salaries comparable to the op-
portunity costs of the returning talent) proposition. In addi-
tion, as soon as the diaspora member is returned, he or she is 
likely to become part of the entrenched vested interest again. 
All of these considerations make an attractive alternative—lat-
eral and horizontal—inside-out reform (table 2). 
As the Taiwanese (China) example illustrates, the inside-out 
transformation bets on the heterogeneity of the elites: it creates 
an alliance between forward-looking and dynamic segments, 
incorporating  the  diaspora  overachievers  into  the  elite.  The 
transformation often starts with institutional innovation ig-
nored by established players (large banks and firms didn’t take 
seriously the venture capital program in Taiwan [China]). The 
inside-out  transformation  occurs  by  incorporation—turning 
the established elite into an ally of the institutional innovation. 
Policy Implications: Toward a New Genera-
tion of Diaspora Initiatives  
How does matching of dynamic segments of diaspora talent 
and dynamic segments of the government occur? Ramon Gar-
cia stumbled at his match—the CEO of Fundación Chile at Mi-
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ment facilitating serendipitous matches between domestic and 
diaspora champions?    
With few exceptions (such as South Korea in the 1970s), 
centralized schemes, particularly those managed by the govern-
ment, have proved to be of limited efficacy in terms of reaching 
this objective. And so are many  recommendations of the cur-
rent diaspora debate: ever more detailed studies of diasporas, 
digital diaspora networks, and conferences of diaspora mem-
bers. They are useful as entry points and initial introduction, 
but they cannot substitute for detailed and lengthy discussions 
over possible joint projects between public sector champion(s) 
and diaspora overachiever(s). 
Three approaches have emerged to provide a framework to 
articulate and implement joint projects.  
The first follows the logic of how Ivy League universities 
work with their alumni. An intentionally small group of dias-
pora overachievers are invited to join an elite diaspora program: 
Global Scot has about 900 members, whereas Chile Global 
about 100. The program is housed within an entrepreneurial 
and capable economic development organization (Scottish En-
terprise and Fundación Chile respectively) to follow up on the 
joint projects. Significantly, even for those highly capable orga-
nizations, the binding constraint is in the home country: its 
ability to follow up and implement ideas and projects of the 
diaspora members rather than commitments of the diaspora.    
This observation indicates that this high-intensity approach 
is  predicated  on  sophisticated  domestic  capabilities,  an  ap-
proach that might be too demanding for low-income countries. 
Top-down transformation Bottom-up change Inside-out reform
Change agents Returning students and other experts form 
reform, policy-making, and policy advice 
teams
Policy or institutional entrepreneurs 
establish new institutions at home
Diaspora overachievers and government 
champions jointly initiate and sustain 
multiple, incremental changes from 
diverse entry points
Examples Indonesia:1966/1983—Berkeley Mafia
South Korea: 1970s and 1980s—
Economic Planning Board and Government 
Research Institutes
Nigeria: On-going, top decision-making 
positions in the government 
China: Science and technology parks for 
returning technical talent 
Single, institutional entrepreneur 
establishes an enclave organization in 
higher education, health, or other sector: 
many examples in Africa, Asia, and other 
parts of the world 
Taiwan (China): Creation of VC industry in 
the 1980s 
India: Improvement in the legal 
and institutional framework for 
entrepreneurship in the 1990s 
How transformation 
occurs
Mobilization: Top decision maker 
facilitates university education abroad 
and installs reform, policy advice, or 
technical teams on the basis of returning 
skills
Entrepreneurship: Individuals act despite 
obstacles
Bootstrapping: Joint search for solutions 
relying on and leveraging better-
performing segments of government and 
public sector
Vulnerabilities/risks Reform team is removed or becomes 
entrenched
Reforms hit a wall: Enclaves fail to 
expand, diffuse, or turn into role models 
to follow
Transformation is incremental: It is 
relatively robust, but slow and may fizzle 
out
Specific assets (skills, 
motivation) of talent 
abroad
Technical skills in a specific area: 
economic, scientific, or technological 
expertise
Both the technical skills and unusually 
high self-motivation to prevail  and 
succeed
Creative and pragmatic problem solving: 
While technical skills are useful, the key 
is the capability to research and combine 
knowledge from diverse policy domains
Dealing with entrenched 
and vested interests
Shake up: Effective in the short term, 
but risky in the longer term (as vested 
interests regroup and strike back and 
as diaspora itself becomes again part of 
vested interests)
Assault: Direct confrontation (may work 
in specific domains)
Strategic bet: That the institutional 
innovation would be initially ignored by 
the vested interests as an oddity and then 
could be protected by its own success
Transformation: Turning forward-looking 
segments of the vested interests into 
allies. Robust and effective in the long 
run, but vulnerable as transformation 
can occur the other way around (change 




Starts with return migration, which may 
turn into brain circulation
Typically, return migration Starts with brain circulation, which, if the 
reforms succeed, leads to return migration 
(as the talent abroad creates conditions 
and opportunities for its own return) 
Source: Compiled by author.
Table 2. Skills Abroad as Change Agents at Home: Typology6  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK  	 	 www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
A contrasting “light touch” approach focuses on dissemina-
tion success stories of diaspora—home country interactions and 
generally on learning from emerging good practice. Through 
focused workshops, the objective is to transform success stories 
into role models to follow.    
A third approach, which is just emerging, intends to  provide 
room for bottom-up creativity and initiative, while ensuring the 
sharing of best practice between decentralized and bottom-up 
projects and experiments. A contest, pioneered independently 
in Mexico in 2009 and Russia in 2010, provided matching 
funds to organizations in a home country interested in articulat-
ing and running a project with diaspora members that advance 
their own missions and objectives. Both in Russia and Mexico 
the beneficiaries are domestic research and development organi-
zations. These contests are too new, so the jury is still out on 
their performance. The key feature is their focus on domestic 
organizations as immediate beneficiaries, not on the diaspora 
members. This reflects the understanding that domestic capa-
bilities are key binding constraints and also provides an entry 
points for domestic champions to articulate their projects.         
In such a contest, one organization might be interested, say, 
in leveraging diaspora professionals to test new methods of de-
livery of preventive medicine to a low-income population. It 
would then formulate a proposal for the diaspora contest which 
will be considered receiving matching fund contributions. Op-
erational details would obviously differ from country to coun-
try, but such a contest fund would have clear eligibility criteria 
and could support institutionalized diaspora initiatives for a 
period of up to three years with a limit of $100,000 contribu-
tions per year, and support 10–20 focused, global search initia-
tives with the help of diaspora.  
Ideally, each diaspora network, within a portfolio of initia-
tives to be supported by the contest, would be characterized by 
the following features:      
•  The ability to identify, bet on, and manage strategic first 
movers. Strategic first movers are individuals with a longer 
than usual planning horizon: they are not philanthropists, 
yet they have more patience in seeing returns on their effort 
and investment. 
•  Focus on mentoring as a key feature in nourishing joint proj-
ects between diasporas and home country organizations. 
Another way to describe a search function of diaspora mem-
bers is to characterize them as mentors: they do not do the 
work themselves, but primarily help home country organi-
zations to perform their functions  better.
Conclusion 
Direct economic impacts of diaspora relate to the remittances, 
donations, investments, and knowledge of diaspora members. 
These impacts are well known and documented, particularly the 
size and dynamics of migrant remittances (World Bank 2010). 
This note points out that the increased salience of diasporas to 
home economies goes beyond their direct economic impacts. 
Diasporas  of  the  highly  skilled  can  contribute  to  institution 
building through multiple, incremental changes that lead to the 
transformation of private and public sector institutions.
Direct economic impact is about the breadth of diaspora en-
gagement, whereas the institution-building impact is about its 
depth. While remittances and donations—currently the focus 
of migration debates—are important for poverty reduction, the 
key issue is how to turn migrants and diasporas into agents of 
change in institutional development in their home countries. 
  Members  of  expatriate  communities,  particularly  over-
achievers, have three characteristics that position them to make 
a unique contribution to the development of their home coun-
try:  a  strong  motivation  to  “make  their  mark”  despite  and 
against many odds; knowledge and expertise of both global op-
portunities and local particulars; and (not always, but frequent-
ly) resources to act on new opportunities. When these resourc-
es combine, usually as a matter of serendipity, the impact on 
home country development can be substantial. Yet these re-
sources can combine also in a negative way: diaspora overachiev-
ers can also become ferocious rent seekers allying themselves 
with reactionary and backward-looking vested interests in the 
home country. 
Paradoxically, it is home country institutions that appear 
to be key determinants of diaspora impact. Yet both home 
country institutions and diaspora are highly heterogeneous. 
When dynamic, forward-looking, and better-performing seg-
ments of the diaspora and the government develop joint prag-
matic projects, these projects have the potential of triggering 
institutional dynamics that are at once humble (in the short 
term) and ambitious (in the long run): economic and institu-
tional change that begin in certain locations and/or sectoral 
domains, and advance through partial and incremental (mi-
crolevel) reforms that with time may aggregate into larger-
scale transformations.
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Endnotes
1. This note is based on some of the findings  from the project 
“How Can Talent Abroad Help Reform Institutions at Home” 
funded by the MacArthur Foundation (visit the Global Dias-
pora Project Web site for more information about the project). 
2. Visit www.ChileGlobal.org for more information.
3. This is not to say that diasporas cannot themselves become 
entrenched. Diaspora organizations can pursue narrow objec-
tives with little consideration of the interests of the country 
they presumably represent. Long-distance nationalism of dia-
sporas (see Kapur [2006]) can be unproductive and detri-7  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK  	 	 www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
mental. A tendency of diaspora organizations to become en-
trenched and pursue narrow objectives is one reason to focus 
on informal diaspora networks and individual overachievers.
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